Cloze Exercise

The Tet Offensive, inc. Khe Sanh, Hue, My Lai

1. CAUSES

Two conflicting views on why the Offensive happened:

a. Opportunity

• North Vietnamese saw war = stalemate by 1967: US bombing had failed, US public support ↓

• Hoped S. Vietnamese people would rise up, ARVN collapse, & that US would realise it couldn’t win → withdraw

• Soldiers told by Party propaganda: great victory close

b. Despair

• By 1967: S. Vietnam’s govt was stabilising, US bombing + Search & Destroy tactics were working

• Ho Chi Minh, Giap & moderates began pushing for peace negotiations

• Southern-firsters carried out Anti-Party purge, took over Politburo, demanded full-scale attack

2. WHY THE PAVN-VC DID WELL INITIALLY

a. Surprise: launched during Tet (Vietnamese New Year); 36-hour meant half ARVN on leave

b. Long-term planning: PAVN-VC had built up troops & intelligence since summer 1967

c. US errors: senior command knew about build-up but didn’t inform officers/govt

d. PAVN-VC = battle-hardened vs inexperienced US ‘cherries’

3. EVENTS

a. 31 Jan 1968: 80,000 PAVN-VC attacked 100 towns/cities → 21 weeks of fighting

b. Saigon

• 35 VC battalions attacked: ◦ targets incl. US HQ at ; ◦ suicide squad seized US (6 hrs); ◦ PAVN-VC cleared only by April

c. ‘Mini-Tet’ (May) & Phase III (Aug): 2 further PAVN-VC offensives

d. Khe Sanh, 21 Jan–5 Jul 1968

(i) CAUSES/CONTEXT:

• Khe Sanh = key part of McNamara Line, close to Laos/Ho Chi Minh Trail, isolated → vulnerable

• Intended to distract US from Tet areas (or vice versa – US unclear at time)

(ii) EVENTS:

• 21 Jan: 20k-40k PAVN besieged US Marines

• Relief reached base 8 Apr; fighting continued until July

• US finally withdrew; base closed in July

(iii) CONSEQUENCES:

• PAVN victory – McNamara Line

e. Hue, 31 Jan–25 Feb 1968

(i) CAUSES/CONTEXT:

• Target city: important port, Highway 1 ran through it, ex-capital, centre of Buddhist protest in 1963

• Many ARVN on Tet leave

(ii) EVENTS:

• VC sappers opened city gate; 11k PAVN-VC took Hue incl. ancient citadel

• US/ARVN retook city by 25 Feb – heavy urban combat

• PAVN-VC c.2,800 civilians – incl. officials, police, doctors, monks

(iii) CONSEQUENCES:

• 75% of homes wrecked, 116k civilians homeless

• US govt used civilian massacre as propaganda to justify war

e. My Lai, 16 Mar 1968

(i) CAUSES/CONTEXT:

• 3 months into Tet; Feb operation to clear VC had failed

• US troops = young, scared, demoralised; drug use, fragging, indiscipline common

• Told area = stronghold of VC’s Local Force

• Told that civilians gone → “They’re all VC, now go get them”

(ii) EVENTS:

• C Company (Capt. Medina) entered My Lai 4

• 1st Platoon (Lt. ) found no VC, no resistance – murdered 347 civilians incl. women & babies

• Mass rapes, grenades, water supply polluted, executions incl. infants

• Helicopter pilot Hugh Thompson tried to stop killings

• B Company killed 60-155 civilians at nearby My Khe 4

(iii) CONSEQUENCES:

• Initially covered up – official report claimed 90 VC killed, 1 US wounded (later found to have been self-inflicted)

• When revealed 18 months later: few consequences – survivors scattered, only Calley convicted (of 22 murders), sentenced to life imprisonment 1971

• US public reaction mixed – many defended Calley; Nixon cut sentence to house arrest → freed 1975

• Long term: ruined US image – smeared as ‘baby-killers’, anti-war movement ↑, US motives questioned

4. WHY THE PAVN-VC WERE DEFEATED

a. Westmoreland had repositioned 15 US battalions to Saigon = “most DECISION of the war”

b. US/ARVN = too strong in manpower & firepower

c. Offensive = overambitious: forced VC into open battle → couldn’t hold territory

• North Vietnamese Politburo member Tran Van Tra (1983): overestimated own strength, underestimated US

d. S. Vietnamese did not rise up, ARVN fought effectively

5. DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES

“Only military action that ”

a. PAVN-VC:

• Huge defeat: 45,000 PAVN-VC killed – mostly VC incl. top fighters/leaders

• Lost territory in South; PAVN sent new leaders South

• Army needed 4 yrs to recover

• Apr 1969: issued – ‘Never again are we going to risk our entire military force.’

• Le Duan weakened; took over PAVN → rebuilt PAVN for 1975 victory

• 3 Apr 1968: Hanoi opened negotiations.

b. South Vietnam:

• 14.3k civilians killed, 70k homes destroyed, 627k new refugees

• Shock: war reached cities; 80% of towns/villages briefly captured

• End of democratic phase – Thieu + Party seized power → dictatorship

c. USA:

• 1.5k US troops killed – relatively low, but Tet = psychological defeat/’futility of war’

• ‘Credibility gap’ – Westmoreland’s ‘’ tour vs. what people were seeing on their TV (eg Saigon Embassy attack)

• Execution on camera of on camera and My Lai undermined America’s moral right to be in Vietnam

• LBJ chose not to stand again; Westmoreland replaced by Abrams → move to ‘’

• Shift in policy: no more escalation, search for peace talks

1. CAUSES

Two conflicting views on why the Offensive happened:

a. Opportunity

• North Vietnamese saw war = stalemate by 1967: US bombing had failed, US public support ↓

• Hoped S. Vietnamese people would rise up, ARVN collapse, & that US would realise it couldn’t win → withdraw

• Soldiers told by Party propaganda: great victory close

b. Despair

• By 1967: S. Vietnam’s govt was stabilising, US bombing + Search & Destroy tactics were working

• Ho Chi Minh, Giap & moderates began pushing for peace negotiations

• Southern-firsters carried out Anti-Party purge, took over Politburo, demanded full-scale attack

2. WHY THE PAVN-VC DID WELL INITIALLY

a. Surprise: launched during Tet (Vietnamese New Year); 36-hour CEASEFIRE meant half ARVN on leave

b. Long-term planning: PAVN-VC had built up troops & intelligence since summer 1967

c. US errors: senior command knew about build-up but didn’t inform officers/govt

d. PAVN-VC = battle-hardened vs inexperienced US ‘cherries’

3. EVENTS

a. 31 Jan 1968: 80,000 PAVN-VC attacked 100 towns/cities → 21 weeks of fighting

b. Saigon

• 35 VC battalions attacked: ◦ targets incl. US HQ at LONG BINH; ◦ suicide squad seized US EMBASSY (6 hrs); ◦ PAVN-VC cleared only by April

c. ‘Mini-Tet’ (May) & Phase III (Aug): 2 further PAVN-VC offensives

d. Khe Sanh, 21 Jan–5 Jul 1968

(i) CAUSES/CONTEXT:

• Khe Sanh = key part of McNamara Line, close to Laos/Ho Chi Minh Trail, isolated → vulnerable

• Intended to distract US from Tet areas (or vice versa – US unclear at time)

(ii) EVENTS:

• 21 Jan: 20k-40k PAVN besieged US Marines

• Relief reached base 8 Apr; fighting continued until July

• US finally withdrew; base closed in July

(iii) CONSEQUENCES:

• PAVN victory – McNamara Line ABANDONED

e. Hue, 31 Jan–25 Feb 1968

(i) CAUSES/CONTEXT:

• Target city: important port, Highway 1 ran through it, ex-capital, centre of Buddhist protest in 1963

• Many ARVN on Tet leave

(ii) EVENTS:

• VC sappers opened city gate; 11k PAVN-VC took Hue incl. ancient citadel

• US/ARVN retook city by 25 Feb – heavy urban combat

• PAVN-VC EXECUTED c.2,800 civilians – incl. officials, police, doctors, monks

(iii) CONSEQUENCES:

• 75% of homes wrecked, 116k civilians homeless

• US govt used civilian massacre as propaganda to justify war

e. My Lai, 16 Mar 1968

(i) CAUSES/CONTEXT:

• 3 months into Tet; Feb operation to clear VC had failed

• US troops = young, scared, demoralised; drug use, fragging, indiscipline common

• Told area = stronghold of VC’s Local Force 48TH BATTALION

• Told that civilians gone → “They’re all VC, now go get them”

(ii) EVENTS:

• C Company (Capt. Medina) entered My Lai 4

• 1st Platoon (Lt. CALLEY) found no VC, no resistance – murdered 347 civilians incl. women & babies

• Mass rapes, grenades, water supply polluted, executions incl. infants

• Helicopter pilot Hugh Thompson tried to stop killings

• B Company killed 60-155 civilians at nearby My Khe 4

(iii) CONSEQUENCES:

• Initially covered up – official report claimed 90 VC killed, 1 US wounded (later found to have been self-inflicted)

• When revealed 18 months later: few consequences – survivors scattered, only Calley convicted (of 22 murders), sentenced to life imprisonment 1971

• US public reaction mixed – many defended Calley; Nixon cut sentence to house arrest → freed 1975

• Long term: ruined US image – smeared as ‘baby-killers’, anti-war movement ↑, US motives questioned

4. WHY THE PAVN-VC WERE DEFEATED

a. Westmoreland had repositioned 15 US battalions to Saigon = “most CRITICAL TACTICAL DECISION of the war”

b. US/ARVN = too strong in manpower & firepower

c. Offensive = overambitious: forced VC into open battle → couldn’t hold territory

• North Vietnamese Politburo member Tran Van Tra (1983): overestimated own strength, underestimated US

d. S. Vietnamese did not rise up, ARVN fought effectively

5. DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES

“Only military action that BOTH SIDES LOST”

a. PAVN-VC:

• Huge defeat: 45,000 PAVN-VC killed – mostly VC incl. top fighters/leaders

• Lost territory in South; PAVN sent new leaders South

• Army needed 4 yrs to recover

• Apr 1969: issued DIRECTIVE 55 – ‘Never again are we going to risk our entire military force.’

• Le Duan weakened; TRUONG CHINH took over PAVN → rebuilt PAVN for 1975 victory

• 3 Apr 1968: Hanoi opened negotiations.

b. South Vietnam:

• 14.3k civilians killed, 70k homes destroyed, 627k new refugees

• Shock: war reached cities; 80% of towns/villages briefly captured

• End of democratic phase – Thieu + CAN LAO Party seized power → dictatorship

c. USA:

• 1.5k US troops killed – relatively low, but Tet = psychological defeat/’futility of war’

• ‘Credibility gap’ – Westmoreland’s ‘END IN VIEW’ tour vs. what people were seeing on their TV (eg Saigon Embassy attack)

• Execution on camera of NGUYEN VAN LEM on camera and My Lai undermined America’s moral right to be in Vietnam

• LBJ chose not to stand again; Westmoreland replaced by Abrams → move to ‘VIETNAMISATION’

• Shift in policy: no more escalation, search for peace talks